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Introductory Notes
This paper represents the text for the Annual Phi Beta Kappa ad-
dress given at the University of Kansas on Friday evening, March 3,
1911, under the announced title of "Science in SocialPractice." The
Universi!) DailY Kansan, Thursday, February 23, 1911 (Vol. VII, No.
58, p. 1), carried the following story announcing Mead's visit:
Phi Beta Kappa Speaker. Professor George B. Mead, of the
philosophy department of Chicago University; will deliver the
annual Phi Beta Kappa address on Friday evening, March 3.
Mr. Mead is an excellent talker and comes with a national
reputation as a speaker. The speech will be open to the public
and all members of the university are invited.
The DailY Kansan also carried a story reporting on Mead's talk on
Saturday, March 4, 1911 (Vol. VII, No. 61, p. 1):
PLEA FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE: Professor Meade Addresses
Phi Beta Kappa in Chapel, Professor Geo. B. Meade, of the
department of philosophy at the University of Chicago, gave
the annual Phi Beta Kappa address last evening in which he
made a strong plea for scientific methods in social practices.
He explained that while physical science has made vast strides,
social science has had very litde advancement since the time of
the ancients. The definition of an atom has changed twenty
* Harold Orbach of the Department of Sociology at Kansas State University has
kindly provided us with this previously unpublished manuscript from his Mead
archive and also wrote the introductory notes. We are deeply indebted to Orbach
not only for contributing this article but also for submitting to a day-long interview
with the editors.
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times to meet new phenomena, while the minutely worded
laws which control justice in this country, have not been modi-
fied for centuries.
According to Professor Meade, in criminal actions scienceshould
be used in dealing with each problem as it comes up and mo-
tives, not facts, should be the ruling factors. Some of the steps
which have been taken to put science in social practice are the
recall and referendum, the juvenile court and the parole sys-
tem. Professor Meade maintains that justice should be the
socializingof an individual rather than punishment. He closed
the remarks by saying: "Nothing could please me more than to
see science have the same right of way in social practice as it
has in physical practice." ,
If the story in the University Kansan is accurate, Mead added this
final sentence extemporaneously at the end of his written text.
Science in Social Practice
There is no more striking difference between the ancient and the
modern worlds than that revealed in their fashions ofdress, ofarmor,
and of building. Study the garb of men and women of Greece and
Rome, of Persia, and of Egypt during the thousand years and more
that are covered by the remains of their monuments, and then place
beside these fashions, unchanged in their essentials during the whole
period, the bewildering variety of dress which confronts one who
turns to the repositories of medieval history, culture and custom.
From the early centuries in which the modern world commenced to
emerge from the old, uneasy change has characterized the fashion in,
which men and women have clothed themselves at home, at court,
and in the field.
The same stability of equipment marks the method in which armies
were fitted for fighting by the nations and civilizations of the ancient
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world. The masses of ancient troops which conquered the world for
Persia, the phalanxes which disputed the hegemony of Greece, the
legions ofRome which presented the ultimate arm ofancient warfare,
remained in their essentials unchanged throughout the histories ofthe
empires which phalanx trampled down and scattered the masses of
Persian troops and stood in their places until the short swords and
flexible maniples ofthe Roman legions disintegrated them in turn and
superseded them as the final victorious formation.
The same uniformity characterized the arms of offence and defence.
They were perfected and fashioned of superior materials. They were
superseded by the arms ofother nations and other civilizations, but in
their form and nature, while they were in fighting hands, they remained
unmodified by theory or practice.
Turn to the treasures of our museums and follow the series ofvases
and vessels and mirrors, the pins and brooches, and see howpersistent
the types of articles were, how the great forms of ancient art and
manufacture dominate the usage ofcenturies and more than centuries.
See the ideas of Greek society embodied in the series of
representations ofGreek divinities. Study the growth in perfection, the
increasing intellectual content in the same form, and still the steady
reforming and restating of the same figure and the same meaning in
a Zeus or a Pallas Athena.
Turn to the house and note the same form in the structure ofthe home
of the citizen and in the house of the god. The temple is wonderful in
the perfection of its lines and the balance of its proportions, but it is
the perfected home of the city's greatest citizen. The palace of the
Roman emperor but multiplies the house. The unit is the same and the
form ofthe unit unchanged as were the ideas in Plato's World beyond
the Heavens.
The forms of thing remained. The Aristotelian essences which are
Platonic ideas embodied in individual things represent in their finality
the fashion that was slowly brought to perfection by art and
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artisanship, to self-consciousness by philosophy, but which existed.us
sub specie aeternitatis; not as the fashion of our world which passes
away.
It is quite in accordance with this attitude of the ancient world that
practice remained largely unaffected by physical theory. It would be
difficult to point to any phase of practice in war, in the arts and
manufacture, in engineering or agriculture in which the practice ofthe
ancients was transformed by their science. Archimedes created the
science ofStatics, but it was as a field within which to carry further the
mathematics ofhis time and that mathematics was geometry. Physical
science in Greece reached its climax in cosmology, its statement ofthe
movements of the heavenly bodies, and the final statement made by
Ptolemy met the demands of the observations of the times. Its
distinction between the heavenly spheres and the sublunar sphere, its
distinction between the soli earth with its quality of weight and the
substances of water, air, fire, and ether, satisfied the problems which
suggested themselves to the physicists. Medicine advanced in its
surgery and the consequent study of anatomy to considerable results
of the scientific character. But the therapeutic treatment of disease
never rose above an empirical practice that was largely controlled by
tradition and was too confined by ignorance of physiology and the
chemistry of its materia medica to become scientific.
Even when geometry had acquainted educated men with the theory
of measurement of surfaces and solids we find that in Egypt, where
was the center ofancient science, surveying for the government ofthe
Ptolemy's clung to ancient rules of thumb which were palpably
incorrect. Apart from the mythical tales of the achievements of
Archimedes in the defence ofSyracusethere isno evidence that ancient
physics modified in any material degree their practice in war. Their
architecture presented no problems that aroused men to consider the
nature of physical forces. Their whole conduct lay so completely
within the traditional practice that men felt no inclination to invention.
Indeed throughout the entire history of the ancient world it would be
impossible to point to t a single invention which had reconstructed any
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form of physical practice. Advance consisted in the realization of the
ideas that lay behind the traditional methods and customs and
operations, and their perfection, and even this perfection was
conceived of largely from the standpoint of the aesthetic judgement.
If we turn now to the beginnings of the modern world we find in
the most universal and essential fields of physical practice,
problems which inevitably forced upon the consciousness of
Europe the study of subjects which were without interest for the
ancients or were even beyond their ken. Note the rapid changes
which took place in warfare. See the development of the
defensive armor of the knight and his castle pushed to such
extremes that new forms of tactics and new forms of weapons of
offence were invented to overthrow the iron encased cavalry and
their impregnable castles. The light armored bowman unhorsed
the knight, the demand for an adequate weapon with which to
attack the castle led to the invention of gunpowder and the
cannon, and the whole field of warfare became the field of
physical problems, that invited the study of the physicist, and
forced dynamics upon the consciousness of the fourteenth
century mathematicians of Italy. The restless change in the
manners of fighting carried with it an inevitable curiosity as to the
power which new weapons promised. It carried with it the question
whether the offence would be equal to the defence, and these were
problems that could not be stated except in terms of dynamics.
The ancient temple, being but the idealization of the ancient house
carried no other problems with it than those of bringing the building
materials to the positions which a simple architecture demanded. The
achievement of the Parthenon was the glory of the artist not an '
engineer. Ifthe stone could be brought and placed in its proper course
there was no need to question whether it would crush its foundations.
The sides of the temples of the noblest dimensions never reached a
height in comparison with its width which raised doubts as to it
toppling over with the weight it bore. There were no problems of the
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side thrust which awakened the anxiety ofmedieval architects and led
to the buttressing of the walls of medieval cathedrals.
The cathedral was not the house of the divinity who was also a
citizen of the city. It was the house of the God of
otherworldliness. It strove to overpower by its contrast with the
mean dimensions of the houses of the city. Its nave, narrow in
proportion to its height, gave that sense of upward striving which
should carry religious devotion away from the city which the
Grecian temple idealized. Its enormous and towering spires
directed attention to heaven. Its walls shut in from the world its
worshippers by impressive masses. Every motive in its structure
set itself in opposition to the daily life and practice of the
inhabitants of the medieval city. Thus while the building of the
Greek temple carried with it no physical problems that were not
involved in the building of the house of the ordinary citizen, the
cathedral by the very infinity it sought to symbolize brought
with it problems of stresses and strains, of the crushing weight of
piled up walls and towers, which could be solved only by a
science which recognized that the stones in place were still forces
which must be conceived of as in motion.
Literature in Greece and Rome was for a literary class and the copyist
was equal to the task ofits dissemination. Where the drama or the epic
poem or the historic tale or pamphlet sought a wider audience, the
theater or the concourse at the Games provided the audience; and
information, and opinion, and emotional appreciation, attended upon
the art of the reader, the rhapsodist, and the actor. Greek and Roman
religions were religions of cults and custom and not of monuments
and books. Medieval heresies were changing fashions in religion and
demanded that the divine oracles should be at the disposal of every
troubled mind, and out of this demand arose the art of printing.
I have said enough to indicate, and I can do no more tonight, that out
of the restless changing practice of the modern world sprang the .
modern theory that sought to solve the problems which this changing
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practice brought with it. I have suggested this, because I wish to call
your attention to the manner in which modern sciencehas solved these
problems. I think that the method which has been successful in
conquering the obstacles which physical practice has faced, may well
be employed in dealing with the difficulties with which social practice
is confronted.
I will state by way of preface just what I take physical practice to
be. It is first of all approach toward or flight from objects which
are distinguished directly by the eye or other distance sense, or
are presented by the eye or other distance sense, or are presented
by imagination or though, upon some implication, that carries
the mind beyond the field of vision. In the second place it is a
coming to close quarters with the objects toward which man has
moved, a manipulation covers all animal practice. It is specialized
in the pursuit and flight of the beast of prey and his victim
processes of reproduction, in the parental care and dependence of
infant forms; and in man this behavior is only complicated, raised
to a higher power, by the development of manipulation.
Man is the animal with hands that finds or makes and uses tools. The
processes ofmanipulation concentrate many acts into one. Every act
is at bottom but approach and manipulation, but this manipulation
mayresult in covering indefinite distances, and giveus a capacitywhich
raises the force ofa man's hand to the nth power. When we travel with
the locomotive, the steamship, or the aeroplane, and talk with the
telephone and the telegraph, and crush with the hydraulichammer, and
transport overwhelming weights with electric cranes, we have but
complicated the simple processes of approach and manipulation by
the structure of tools, and these tools have arisen through
manipulation. Man increases the diameter ofhis habitat by the radius
of the tool he uses, or he may contract and reduce that diameter to the
realm of a molecule, and be king of the infinite space within the
domain of a nutshell. Thus tools either contract or expand distances
or multiply or refine the power of the human hand.
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Ifwe glance again at the history of the ancient civilizations we see that
the tools which man used during these centuries were hardly different
in principle from those which primitive man used since he first hurled
the missile, priedwith a lever, crushed with a club, and spit with a sharp
stone, dissipated matter with fire and changed its inner nature by
cooking, subdued the wild animal to carry and pull, and served himself
. upon the water with the sustaining buoyancy of wood. Ancient
mechanism departed from these types in surprisingly few instances.
That their tools of industry and war were more refined and of better
stuff, and conquered wider horizons and added more power to the
arm and more nicety to the touch than the tools of the savage is not
in question, nor that with typical tools of early man these societies
accomplished marvels by the organization of men in groups and the
selection of high capacities in their artisans and artists. Social
organization raised the tools with which the ancients worked to
a vastly higher power, but the nature of the tools set definite
limits beyond which ancient society could not go. With few
exceptions the ancients merely modified and perfected tools, the
prototypes of which were to be found in the hands of the savage
Teuton in the forests of Germany. Ancient technology like the
descriptive science ofthe ancients, defined and perfected its objects-
it did not create them.
The problems ofwarfare, of building, of the multiplication of books,
led to the invention ofweapons and forms of forts and bastions, and
finally to gunpowder with all the revolution that has followed in its
house, was not a temple, that was typical of all that other human , ~.'. '
structures were not,-the cathedral, to the printing press, to the book.,~~~,,)C::··<
It led to the telescope and the microscope, to the compass, to the ',,<";, ".. ~
pendulum, to the clock that was a function of the pendulum, and' ·to ..j-,·\~",.:~/,,:
the scientific apparatus which has arisen out ofthe problems ofwhich }~~{{:~:::.'~
a modern science has grown constantly more conscious. These were ~,~::g~i{;,:\>
all ofthem new objects, novel things that had not existed before even <l;Yi\~::~;':::;~
in prototype, ifwe examine their nature. But while the appearance of\~l;?~~~'.<
such new tools with which the medieval world with slowly increasing.,:,~~)?:·~~:,:,,~;
velocity reconstructed the world in which it lived, built even a new:,~r;~~2~/~~';~
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physical universe, and laid the foundations for a new type ofindustrial
democracy the like ofwhich had not been found among the city states
of the old world, while these new tools and the achievements they
made possible are startling and absorbing to those who can read
history aright, there lies back ofthem and is to be found instinct within
them a new method which is even more important, and even more
startling, when we are able to grasp its import.
It is more important because it is the method by which science in the
physical world is constantly constructing new tools and new object
that did not exist before. This new method which makes the greatest
difference between the consciousness of the old world and the new,
is that which gets its first recognized expression in the scientific work
of Galileo. It appears here as dynamics, a new science which enters
fields closed to Archimedes, and its characteristic is that it starts with
a law of change as its fundamental reality and defines its objects in
terms of the uniformities in these changes. TheAnalysis ofDescartes
and the Calculus of Leibnitz and the Fluxions of Newton wee
developments of this new method in dealing with physical
~ objects. Its permanent elements were by finding a system within which
these changes take place, as Newton finally did, it became possible to
define physical things in terms of the changes which arose within the
system, until now the ultimate terms in which our physical science
defines allits objects are velocities and changes in velocity.The biologic
sciences waited long before the doctrine of evolution stated the
animals and plants in terms ofchange. Darwin at last could formulate
a hypothesis which showed how the species of animals and plants
could have arisen out of the living processes. The animal became a
product of the biologic changes which we call life. We define the
animal or plant in terms of the live processes. We do not conceive of
life as a quality with which animals and plants are endowed.
To repeat: the modern in its restlessness has adopted a new point of
view. Change has become the fundamental fact. The only
permanencies are ways in which changes take place. This not
only gives us new terms in which to describe the world but it makes
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It is on this account that physical practice has been
revolutionized within two centuries. The laboratories of modern
physical science are workshops in which to construct the tools
which will make us equal to the tasks which our practice presents
to us. It is because we can look upon life and death as the same in
the view of physical science that we have been able to accomplish
so much for the conservation of life. It is because for the
laboratory the process of disease and health are alike that we can
make health to abound where sickness was dominant. It is
because science has been able to abstract from the metaphysical
essences of things that invention has been able to conceive of the
new tools which have brought million into close relations who
would otherwise been ignorant of each other's existence.
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those laws we are able to control this world, by the structure of new
tools or what is the same thing, new physical objects.
Science in Social Practice
The scientific hypothesis is a constructwhich goes beneath the former
import of things. It knows only one test, that of experiment. If this is
satisfied, the scientist or inventor may state matter in any form that his
hypothesis demands. It recognizes only the problem which arises in
practice, the conditions which the solution of the problem set, the
hypothetical object, and the final test of trial. Thus science has
conceived of electricity as a fluid and again as a vibration, and now it
conceives ofions and electrons, subatomic elements ofelectricity. The
former physical atom, the supposedly irreducible minimum ofmatter,
has been shattered into a thousand particles because the study of
electrolysis, x-rays, and radioactivity are most conveniently stated in
terms of these fragments of that which physics had before defined as
the ultimate particle. At no barrier can the metaphysician stand and say
"thus far and no farther." There is no ultimate being guaranteed by
philosophic doctrine that may not be resolved by the scientific
imagination, ifonly the scientistwillmake ofhis new conceptual object
a better medium for the construction of the tools of thought and
practice.
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incumbent upon science that it should constructs its objects out of '.
these elements, these velocities and changes in velocity. Where the '.,
Aristotelian scientist but described what his perception presented to
his mind, while he but abstracted the essential qualities from thi
perceived object and gathered these together as the nature of the
object, the modern scientist describes his object as ofsuch a nature th t
. a
lt never could be perceived. Molecules and their constituent atoms
would defy any conceivable perception. Molecules and atoms are but
conceptual objects which enable us to state the laws ofchange within
which"" ~hysicalobjectmust be constructed, and for that reason they
are quite independent of the meaning and value which human
experience gives to them at anyone time. The molecular
struc~e ~f mat~er is indifferent to the character of the living
?r~sm ill which we conceive it to appear. It is just as
indifferent to the passing inanimate textures through which we
conceive it to have passed form the primordial stardust out of
which solar systems have arisen. For science an object is not what
we perceive it to be, but a series of processes by which we account
for our perceived world coming into being. The fact that Aristotelian
science accepted the world ofperceptual experience as the essence of
?bjects, as the reality ofthings, fixed the objects ofhuman experience
In the form which this science found them.
There are, then, two striking characteristics of the modern scientific
object. First that it is constructed out ofchanges whose laws are known
or to be known, and therefore subject to a high degree ofcontrol, for
a change whose law is known can be used, can be employed, can .
become a tool. The second characteristic is that the structure of the .
sci:ntific object is itself quite indifferent to the values and meanings .
which our experience endows it with. It is therefore material out of
which new objects of experience can be constructed. From it can be
made the tools by means of which the world can be made anew. In'
~ word, physical science does not recognize any metaphysical nature ...
ill the world ofphysical practice. It presents hypothetical structures
such a molecules, vortex atoms, ions and electrons, which enable it to
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Who will attempt to say what hypotheses will govern the thought of .
our grandchildren? How shall we conceive of the strange phenomena
of disease following upon the activity of micro-organisms in the
human system, or the still stranger phenomena of immunity to their
attacks? A brilliant German scientist imagines these micro-organisms
set with protuberances and hooks with which corresponding
excrescences upon the particles of chemical substances introduced
into the blood interlock. He finds this the easiest method ofconceiving
the results he reaches, and who will say him nay. Perhaps another
decade will find these excrescences securely lodged in the textbooks
of organic chemistry. Whatever image will best enable man to gain
readiest control over the disease and achieve the immunity is welcome.
Whether the conception is fantastic or is at variance with fonner
doctrine are questions that will never be asked. With such complete
freedom does the physical scientist enter upon his task ofmaking our
world more comprehensible and our practice, therefore, more
successful.
What is the situation in social practice? Is the same freedom allowed
to science in controlling the social conduct? From one point ofview
this question seems ill advised, and that is the standpoint of science
itself. How can we demand freedom for science in the construction
ofsocial objects in testing new social hypotheses, when social science
has not as yet become exact? Until we have isolated the uniformities
c:>fsocial change and can show acknowledged laws ofsocial processes,
it would seem idle to seek for greater freedom for the scientist; to
encourage him to form and test hypotheses when he is unable to define
these in terms of fixed ratios of social movement. To make the
question more concrete, can we establish a science ofEugenics when
we do not understand the changes which are responsible for variation
of children from the parent stocks, when were are still unable to
present a theory of heredity which can be brought to the final test of
experiment? Have statistics revealed to us laws ofsocial change which
can lay claim to the exactness ofthe laws ofthe physical sciences? Social
scientists have for example studied suicide, birth rates, and pauperism
in the light ofchanging social conditions, butwhile they recognize that
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uniformities are there they can not so isolate them that they can use
them as the physical scientist employs his laws of motion. They
conditions which affect these phenomena are so terribly intricate and
so far beyond the reach of laboratory control that the prospect of an
exact social science sees as far from realization at the meetingofparallel
lines at infinity. Shall we say then that social science must remain in the
metaphysical period, that we must satisfy ourselves with the definition
ofmen and women and children as these are given to us in our books
of statutes, in our political handbooks, and in the doctrinal theology,
because we cannot state in terms ofexact laws the social processes out
of which arise personalities, characters, good and evil, standards of
conduct or the content of social justice?
It is certainly true that our social objects are still largely metaphysical.
To begin with, while the psychologist in his experimental science has
abandoned the soul and substituted for this entity the self, and while
he is somewhat tardily studying the processes by which this selfarises
in consciousness, our education still conceives the mind as a container
into which information is to be poured, into whose fibre the
associations ofideas are to be drilled, We talk vaguely ofthe education
of the child being the life of the soul, but our practice belies our talk.
It is the child's soul which is instructed. School life is not the
development ofthe child's self. In fact the pedagogue has carried over
something of the metaphysical nature of the soul into the brain, and
conceives ofimages as stored up in brain cells and rules ofarithmetic
and speech drilled into brain fibre. Our psychology ha sin no small
degree separated the brain, or let us say the central nervous system,
from the rest of the organism and given it as a sensorium something
of the metaphysical character of the soul. It would be easy to extend
this criticism to other phases ofour school room psychology. I know
of nothing that interfered more with a healthful application of the
psychology ofattention than the attitude which our school discipline
takes toward the wandering of attention. We are back here in the
metaphysical dogma of an indifferent will. The child can attend if he
will.
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But let us change the field ofillustration to hat ofpolitics and see how
completely our practice and our would be scientific theory are at odds
with each other. Social theory recognizes that the political selfarises out
ofsocial control. Whether we conceive of this in terms ofimitation or
of social instincts or both, we are well aware that only in the
consciousness of others we have attained to a consciousness of our
own social selves with their rights and obligations. It is the activity of
social control within social conduct that has built up the political
individual, who maintains his own rights and recognizes those of
others. He changes as that social consciousness changes. His whole
political selfhood is a social endowment that comes to him from the
community of which he became a part. And yet our political theory
remains individualistic. Final control lies in that expression of the
common social consciousness which we call public sentiment. The
central fact ingovernment is the relation ofthe individual to this public
sentiment. The great desideratum of political reform lies in bringing
this public sentiment to expression. But how inadequatelyis this done!
How little care have we for the publicity which is the condition of the
existence of the modem democratic state. On the contrary, our
attention is still centered upon preserving the rights of metaphysical
individuals who belong to the 18th Century. We see that the operation
of the courts in maintaining these rights frequently leads to such a
travesty ofsocial justice that the same courts are compelled to reverse
their positions, as they have in the matter of the right of a laborer to
make a contract-as they have in the question of contributory
negligence and the fellow servant.
What is startling in these situations is that we are so committed to a
fixed individualistic political theory, that we cannot adjust our practice
to meet a situation that stares us in the face. We lack the scientific
method that fashions new objectives to answer new problems. The
laborer who in the face of starvation accepts an inadequate wage for
work to be done under unhealthful conditions, is in no sense of the
word the individual who enters freely into a contract, assuming rights
which can be considered his own. This individual is a metaphysical
entity belonging to a doctrinaire political theory. The social scientist is
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able to describe him as he is, handicapped economically, with no
means of carrying his labor to the best market,-hungry and with a
family to maintain, with instincts of workmanship, a sense of
fellowship for his fellow worker, ignorant of the conditions under
which he labors, of the subtle dangers to which he may be exposed,
with a yearning for human response and some perception of a
common good. Every one of these elements goes to determine and
control his conduct in the community. No one ofthem does the strict
political theory recognize-and there is no such interplay between
social theory and social practice that we are able to give another and
more adequate definition to this member of our society. Physical
science has given twenty different definitions to the atom because each
new one has answered to the demands of new conditions; but our
courts in construing men's conduct must abide by an outworn
definition because as yet the method ofsocial practice is not scientific.
Consider a still more flagrant instance ofthis lack ofscientific method
in social control. No one who is at allconversant with the conditions
under which most of our criminal class grow up, has any doubt that
it is the conditions out of which these boys and girls arise plus the
practice of the courts and the police that are responsible for these
criminals. The earliest so-called crimes which the child commits are the
expressions ofthe mischievous impulses ofchildhood. We know that
children have not the knowledge nor the maturity ofcharacter which
are implied in the very conception of crime. But we send them to the
bars of justice. We conflict them for that which has the same moral
quality as robbing an orchard or pummeling a schoolmate. We send
them to an institution where they become members of the fraternity
of outlaws and when they leave the jail it is with a stamp upon them
that keeps most ofthem within the class. Society is breeding, training,
and preserving most of its so-called criminal class. And we stand
almost helpless before this enormity, because our theory of what
constitutes a legal or illegal act, of what constitutes responsibility, of
what constitutes justice is so fixed, so metaphysical, that we cannot
adjust the theory to our practice. We are able to create new varieties
and improve our varieties of plants and animals because we have a
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scientific method which enables us to form new ideas of what the
species is, ofwhat are the causes ofdefects and undesirable qualities.
We can conceive of new forms and better forms because we know
and can control the conditions out of which they will arise.
In the matter of justice the species are fixed by a minutely worded
statute that defines the criminal and by implication the just man, and
the courtis occupied principally i interpreting the meaning of the
statute, not in determining the justice ofthe description. Now while it
is true that the social sciences have not achieved the position ofexact
sciences, they can approach such situations as these with a scientific
spirit, and make use of a scientific method. Indeed we see the
beginnings of this change, we have already noted its somewhat tardy
beginning in Education. In politics, the recall, and the referendum,
imply a new mutual interplay between the individual and public
sentiment, and tends to give this form ofsocial consciousness definite
organs for control in the state. In our juridical procedure the juvenile
court and the system of parole find themselves quite outside the
stereotyped conceptions oflegal justice and recognize the relation of
the misdemeanor to the conditions out of which it arose. They
recognize also that justice should be a process of socializing the
individual-not the awarding offixed penalties for fixed external acts.
In a word, in the most serious problems of social practice we can
see the demand for scientific method, and we can discover the
beginnings of the creations of this scientific method.
This movement has many names: the conservation ofhuman values
,
the insurgency, the recall and the referendum, the elimination of the
juveniledelinquent, the living wage and sanitary shops, the right ofthe
child to his childhood,-I might go on multiplying phases of the
movement-but they all imply new conceptions ofsocial objects and
'they all call for a right to tests of these new conceptions, these
hypotheses in social practice. They all insist that no conception or
definition of rights and wrongs, ofindividuals and states, of acts and
consequences, shall be accepted and maintained unless they actually
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work in meeting the problems of social practice". I know of no more
valuable contribution to this movement than a thoroughgoing
acceptance by the community of the dictum that science has the same
right of way in social practice as that which the modern world has
granted it in physicalpractice. Since the days ofthe FrenchRevoluti~n
men have been becoming more and more clearlyaware that the SOCial
order changeth giving place to the new, but we have not recognized
any method by which this change could e controlled. So men have
clung to certain doctrines, to certain fixed ideas while they have
hesitatingly surrendered others.
We need the faith of the scientist who is willing to surrender all
to the test of experiment. We need to recognize further that
science carries with it no fixed program. It meets each problem as
it arises. The problem arises out of practice and is tested again by
practice. The socialists have come forward with a fixed program.
They have been quite as metaphysical as the theorists whom .they
have sought to supplant. But even in socialism, the programmist is
giving way to the opportunist. They are beginning to demand science
in social control.
Let me close with the suggestion that we are losing the meaning oflife
because we are not willing to conceive of social objects in terms of
social practice. What allhigh endeavor, alldevotion to humanity, what
all religion has sought has been to inspire immediate conduct with the
meaning of the whole of life, to gain the consciousness of the social
meaning of our individual acts, and this is precisely what scientific
method achieves. It states the parts in terms of the whole. It defines
its objects in terms ofthe processes that are going on. Sciencein social ,
practice must be profoundly religious.
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